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TRADE UNIONS STRATEGIES AND PRODUCTIVITY: A SUGGESTED FRAMEWORK
Alan Booth and Joseph Melling
The economic Impact of trade unions is once more the object of vigorous debate in a 
number of countries, including Britain. The proximate cause of the revival of interest in 
Britain was the coincidence of on deceleration in the rate of growth of output per head 
in manufacturing (the 'productivity miracle') and the weakening of the trade union 
movement by rising unemployment and the anti-union legislation of the Conservative 
government. Thus, Muellbauer (1986, iv) offers five possible explanations for the 
'productivity miracle', one of which was the 'industrial relations hypothesis': "the rise in 
unemployment and (changes in) government legislation have weakened the trade 
unions and restored to managers the 'right to manage'. Thus workers have been less 
able to resist the introduction of new technology and more flexible work practices." 
Similar accounts can be found in the work of Maynard (1988), Ball (1989) and others. 
However, the weakness of this analysis was exposed after 1988, when the pace of 
productivity growth in manufacturing slackened enormously without any noticeable 
growth in trade union strength either at the workplace or in law. At the same time, 
economists and socidl scientists are becoming more aware of the ways in which 
different cultural and institutional factors inform the behaviour of economic actors and 
affect the expectations implicit in the bargaining process (Turner, 1989). The time is ripe 
for a re-examination of the place of trade unions in the production process (see 
Abelshauser 1990).
As will be seen below, many writers have constructed models of union behaviour 
without examining the way in which unions devise strategies and how they seek to work 
with an influence the policies of other institutions. It is possible to study the 
consequences of trade union actions without any serious consideration of how 




























































































of unions and the motives of their members (which is the basis for behaviour) then we 
need to take strategy as the focus of research (Abelshauser, 1990).
In defining 'strategy' we accept Mintzberg's distinction between deliberate 
strategies, which are the result of intended action by conscious agents, and emergent 
strategies, which are the cumulative result of a series of decisions within the constraints 
of a particular situation (Mintzberg, 1978). For this distinction to hold, however, we 
recognise that actors need to make consistent choices which reflect a particular set of 
preferences (for example, opting for wage rather than employment targets), in defining 
'productivity', we have in mind output per person employed.
The literature on the impact of trade unions on productivity is massive. The debate has 
been dominated by three economic models: the neo-classical, the institutionalist, and 
the radical or political analysis. We consider each in turn, beginning with the neo­
classical, or Marshallian, approach.
The Marshallian tradition in British economics, with its emphasis on the individual 
and the market, has found it difficult to be anything other than suspicious of 
organisations like the trade unions which seek collective representation in markets. The 
model of union behaviour which lies behind this explanation is broadly as follows. Unions 
control labour supply. They use this power initially to oppose some technological 
improvements and changes to outdated work practices. They will subsequently be 
prepared to bargain the introduction of these productivity improvements but will use 
their power to appropriate the returns to capital. This approach assumes that unions 
have no real positive effects on productivity growth, or that any favourable impact is 
dwarfed by the negative effects on the choice of technique and manning levels. The 




























































































inside or outside the production process. Finally, the failure of the unions to embrace the 
equally obvious strategy of collaborating with managers to diffuse rapidly technologicdl 
best practices to maximise output, employment and earnings must lie in the laws of 
behaviour of British trade unions os institutions.
The strongest case in this tradition has come in recent work by David Metcolf. He 
has used data from the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS) to argue that unions 
tend to inhibit productivity growth. The theoretical model seems to be that set out in the 
previous paragraph, but Metcalf is much more interested in empirical results. His 
evidence seems to suggest that unionised workplaces performed worse in the early 
1980s than did workplaces without unions and that the worst performance of all came 
from those establishments which operated the closed shop. To some extent, this 
evidence is supported by the work of Machin who argues that the negative impact of 
unions on productivity is greatest where firms enjoy high market share or operate in 
industries where production is concentrated in a few enterprises. Thus, unions are able 
to capture a substantial share of profits which a firm can extract when its market power 
is significant,
For all its apparent force, there are problems with this account of the effects of 
trade unions on productivity and unit costs. Metcalfs empirical evidence is very 
uneven. He acknowledges that in Britain trade union organisation "is associated with 
lower labour productivity or, at best, has no effect" (1989). These contradictions are only 
heightened when Metcalf admits that sectors of the economy which have historically 
had a poor level or organisation (such as textiles) have seen as significant an advance 
in productivity during the 1980s as industries which have traditionally been dominated by 
very strong unions. Metcalf's method is to establish correlations between the density of 
trade unionism and the movements in output and productivity levels. His conclusions 
imply a very simple model in which the union has organised all the relevant workers and 




























































































oligopoly is the rule rather than the exception in the British economy in the late twentieth 
century and it has already been demonstrated that the employer's market situation is 
an important element in the ability of the unions to demand higher wages and impose 
job control. The regressions which Metcalf has discovered may represent the interaction 
of a complex set of variables over a specified time period rather than the effects of 
trade unions perse.
In a careful critique. Wadwhani. using a more sophisticated and varied data set, 
has demonstrated that workers in unionised firms are no more likely to appropriate the 
returns to capital than are workers in non-unionised plants. He concedes that unionised 
plants were more likely to have restrictive practices than non-unionised workplaces and 
that these were more noticeable in larger plants. But he rejects the suggestion implicit in 
the 'productivity miracle' analysis that unions always oppose change, since the most 
significant changes took place in unionised shops during 1980-4 and those companies 
with joint consultative committees were actually more likely to experience reforms in 
production methods than those without such formal management-union co-operation. 
The higher the debt-equity ration of a firm, the more likely it was to have improved 
labour productivity improvements in the early 1980s as managements were severely 
disciplined in a period of substantial increase in the number of mergers. Even in these 
circumstances, it is likely that unions would acquiesce in the changes. The net effect of 
this critique is to deny the argument that unions necessarily pursue economic strategies 
which have an adverse impact on productivity growth. Very complex processes were 
unfolding in the British economy in the early 1980s and changes in trade union density 
appear to have played a small part in the picture, a conclusion confirmed by the 
enormous reduction in the rate of productivity growth after 1987. It seems clear that the 
unions have themselves reacted to changing economic and political conditions and 
have tried to adapt to the environment in which they operate. There certainly was a 



























































































-  7 -
product markets were favourable, but it is equally true that in the different market 
conditions of the 1980s firms have been permitted to expand their profitability, finance 
new investment, introduce new technologies (even those which resulted in substantial 
labour displacement) not only with the acquiescence of labour but also as the basis of a 
new contract with the unions involving a substantial reappraisal of the effort bargain. 
Thus, the impact of unions on productivity cannot be assumed from first principles on the 
basis of assumptions about the behaviour of collective organisations in atomistic 
markets. Union behaviour must be examined in the light of changing markets.
The stimulus to the study of trade unions as institutions has been Olson's (1982) analysis of 
the dynamics of collective interest groups. In the normal course of events, such groups 
will face a free rider problem: it is difficult to exclude non-members from the benefits 
won by the group. Rational economic actors will therefore not pay the pecuniary and 
emotional dues to collective organisations and the interest group will have only a short­
lived existence. However, under stable political and social conditions, collective interest 
groups will be able to devise strategies to reward members and exclude non-members 
from benefit. Thus, the longer a society enjoys political and social stability, the more 
likely it is to develop special interest groups whose activities will retard the resource 
reallocations necessary for full exploitation of improved technological possibilities. Thus, 
societies which have not been disrupted by war, occupation or totalitarian government 
tend to develop 'sclerotic' tendencies which stultify the impetus to faster growth. Olson 
attempted to apply these ideas to explain relative rates of economic growth since 1945, 
but he has left a good deal of confusion about what an 'Olson effect' might be, what 
might be the 'underlying pace' of institutional change and development overtime and 




























































































quantitcrtive measure of institutional rigidity (Choi, 1983) has encountered overwhelming 
criticism, and may well be a search for the methodologically impossible (Crafts, 1988, 
xvii).
The trade unions are the most easily identifiable of Olson's special interest 
economic groups, and Batstone (1986) has sought to develop and extend the Olson 
thesis. Batstone has pointed out that Olson's 'sclerotic' tendencies arise in industrial 
relations not only as a result of the stability of the social and political systems but also 
from the 'scope' and 'sophistication' of the organisations of employees and employers. 
Organisations which have narrow scope represent the interests of only small groups 
within any industry and will be more obstructive towards productivity growth than more 
inclusive organisations which would have to bear a much higher share of the costs of 
any growth-inhibiting actions. 'Sophistication' involves the ability of an organisation to 
represent and co-ordinate interests and implement strategies. Batstone uses these tools 
in a table which compares the growth of productivity in 'high' and 'low sclerosis' 
countries for the periods 1950-73 and 1973-9, The results are mixed. In the first period, 
there was a strong positive relationship between the rate of growth of labour 
productivity and the breadth and sophistication of the industrial relations system but that 
relationship broke down in the second period when poor productivity growth was 
associated with countries with broad scope and high sophistication, such as Sweden.
But the problems go deeper and suggest that Batstone has effectively 
undermined Olson's hypothesis. Batstone has identified a number of countries 
(Netherlands, Notwdy. Sweden, Belgium) which exhibit high sclerosis, in the sense that 
there is long continuity in institutions, and broad scope and high sophistication in 
industrial relations institutions. High sclerosis should in Olson's terms be productivity 
inhibiting, whereas broad scope and high sophistication should be productivity 
enhancing, according to Batstone. Batstone sought to modify and extend Olson's 




























































































mistaken in presenting collective interest groups as monolithic structures which have 
clearly defined restrictive strategies. Once it is recognised that Olson's collective interest 
groups might be composed of factions and competing power groups, the weaknesses 
of his analysis become apparent. Once collective interest groups cease to be 
monolithic, they are capable of internal regeneration and are not necessarily growth 
inhibiting.
The second part of Batstone's article indirectly pursues such themes. He looks at 
the failure of efforts to reform British industrial relations since the Donovan Report (1968). 
At the core were attempts to increase the scope of unions (encouraging inter-union co­
operation) and employer organisations and raising their sophistication (by encouraging 
a hierarchy of shop stewards on the union side). Such changes would have changed 
the balance of power within trade unions. Batstone argues, however, that restructuring 
failed because of the lack of sophistication of management, both in labour relations 
and in the more technical aspects of production. In short, the unions were prepared to 
and capable of change but were frustrated by rigidities elsewhere. A similar, though 
more favourable, conclusion emerges from the discussion of the 'productivity miracle' 
noted above. If trade unions hove become involved in the efforts to promote faster 
productivity growth, they have certainly achieved this without increasing either their 
scope or their sophistication. This conclusion appears to leave both the Olson and 
Batstone variants of the institutional rigidity analysis without empirical support.
We deduce from this discussion, first, that Olson's belief that the growth inhibiting 
effect of institutions is related more or less directly to the social and political stability of 
the society in which collective interest groups are found is unlikely to provide useful 
results. The more refined approdch of Batstone in which scope and sophistication are 
the key to the effect of institutions on output and productivity growth is also incapable 
of illuminating what has happened in British manufacturing since 1979. This is not to 



























































































-  10 -
thcrt it is impossible to deduce what that effect will be from either the longevity of the 
political system within which that institution operates or key structural aspects of that 
institution.
Radical analysis of shop floor behaviour, or study of the labour process, has fared rather 
better since its pioneering study by Braverman (1974). Many works have demonstrated 
the capacity of skilled workers to resist capitalist control and defend their autonomy in 
production. The motor car industry has been much studied from this perspective. Not 
the least attractive feature of labour process studies is the strong historical perspective. 
It has been pointed out that motor vehicle production developed comparatively late in 
Britain. Employers were able to adopt very quickly the specialist automatic machinery 
innovated by French, German and especially US producers. The use of semi-automatic 
machinery was also facilitated by the nature of the labour force, which was drawn from 
unemployed and semi- or un-skilled workers from declining industries such as watch- and 
bicycle-making. Thus, the craft Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) failed to get an 
early foothold and the strong bargaining position of the workers found expression in 
demands for improved wages and conditions rather than the defence of skill against 
the threat of dilution. Struggles over the control of production have been primarily 
about payment systems (Gardiner, 1981). Labour process studies have demonstrated 
the ways in which each successive attempt by managers to raise the productive 
potential of the workforce relative to its cost has been partially neutered by the ability of 
key groups of shopfloor workers to reassert control.
Managers first found it very difficult to co-ordinate the complex processes of 
vehicle manufacture and turned to individual piece work systems which induced 




























































































However, the shopfloor retained the ability to control the pace of work which was 
critical in increasing the power of workers in the very strong demand conditions which 
prevailed in the 40 years after the industry was granted protection in 1915. As managers 
turned successively to the gang system and finally to measured day work, workers found 
ways to so manipulate job timings that shopfloor workers retained control over the pace 
of work. In this way. British motor car producers have required many more worker-hours 
to build motor cars than has been needed in other countries and have appropriated 
some of the returns to investment. This extent of shopfloor control in British car plant can 
be seen as a disincentive to invest in UK production in an industry increasingly 
dominated by multinational firms.
It is. however, possible for labour process theorists to produce almost 
diametrically opposite conclusions. Peter Nolan, for example, has argued (1989) that 
Britain continues to suffer poor labour productivity levels in the 1980s because of its 
commitment to the production of low value added goods rather than to the research 
intensive sectors of the new industries. In this situation, it was not the strength but the 
weakness of the unionised workforce which enabled manufacturers to continue to use 
labour intensively rather than shift to higher productivity methods. The apparent 
productivity gains of the 1980s were, according to Nolan, merely the result of greater 
pressure on the workforce, reflecting the further weakening of organised labour at the 
start of the decade. Managers were able to drive their workers harder and to introduce 
new technologies to the shopfloor. Nolan was surely right in believing that there had not 
been fundamental changes to the British economic structure or underlying rate of 
productivity growth in the early 1980s; the increase in the rate of productivity growth was 
the result of specific political changes which could be reversed,
There are, however, difficulties with this approach. Nolan suggests that the 
'defeat' of trade unionism has ensured that Britain has increasingly become a low-cost 



























































































-  12 -
the motor car Industry suggests that the strength of British trade unionism has countered 
the efforts of British managers to seek production methods that have been efficient on a 
world scale. There must be doubts about an analysis which can so easily produce two 
very different answers to the question 'why has the British economy achieved such 
comparatively poor rates of growth of labour productivity?' Part of the problem arises 
because labour process literature cannot easily combine analysis of capitalist relations in 
industry with an understanding of the policies of unions as autonomous institutions. For it 
is evident that the resources of such organisations in part depend upon their political 
and social standing rather than their economic functions. Britain has been 
characterised by reasonably stable industrial relations despite slow economic growth. Is 
it possible that trade unions are engaged in a complex process of trading institutional 
stability for limited economic rewards and a slow pace of innovation? Some writers 
have suggested that unions were willing to trade wages for jobs in the interwar years 
(see Booth, 1987), though this was not necessary in the postwar boom. Yet they did not 
achieve the high wage, high productivity returns which British unions aspired to and 
which Swedish and German labour achieved. An important problem would be the 
precise ways in which strategies for wages and workloads were formulated and the 
outcome of bargaining on the perceived effort of the labour force. In other words, the 
'social relations' view of productivity tends to present output as the result of a clear 
power game in which capital and labour contend of maximum returns (see Nicholls, 
1987; Williams et al, 1989 for exceptions). This view tends to collapse institutions like trade 
unions into an expression of class or sectional interests. As this is exactly the approach of 
the neo-classical theorists it is hardly surprising that there is a surprising amount of 
common ground between labour process theorists and more orthodox studies of the 
'British disease' when it comes to the effects of trade union organisation, especially 
among the skilled (such as Phelps Brown, 1977), It is also possible to combine neo­



























































































-  13 -
associates (Crafts 1988; Broadberry 1988; Broadberry and Crafts 1990) which seeks to 
provide a long run explanation of slow growth in Britain during the present century.
IV
From the mid-1980s when his attention turned to the problems of the twentieth century 
British economy, N.F.R. Crafts has developed a simple model to explain Britain's relatively 
slow rate of manufacturing productivity growth from 1914 and its apparent acceleration 
after 1979. The model is simple because it is rooted very securely in the neo-classical 
approach and its powerful analytical device, growth accounting. One of the bedrocks 
of the analysis Is a comparison of British and American physical output per operative 
over the period 1907-47 (Broadberry and Crafts 1990; hereafter BC). These figures show 
that the relatively small productivity gap which was apparent in 1907 opened 
dramatically over the period of the First World War (Broadberry 1988). The US lead 
appears to narrow over the 1930s in the majority of industries, but widens again over the 
period of the Second World War (BC, 5). This differential increases from the late 1940s to 
the mid-1960s, when there are signs that the gap begins to close, only to open up again 
during the 1970s (Crafts 1988b), As might be expected from work produced in the 
euphoria over the 'productivity miracle', the gap appeared to be closing in the 1980s, 
though apparently by not as much as during the period 1964-73 (Crafts 1988b, 2).
To explain the opening of the gap between US and UK productivity in 
manufacturing from 1907 to 1937, Crafts and associates turn to growth accounting. 
They begin with factor inputs but find that the substantially higher fuel costs in the UK 
and the superior levels of capital per worker in the US cannot explain the differential. 
The much larger size of the US market, giving longer production runs and greater 
economies of scale, and higher levels of human capital formation in the USA do purport 



























































































-  14 -
formulation: in a competitive economy, these 'economic fundamentals' should
account for all observed productivity differentials. To explain a persistent productivity 
gap it is essential to invoke market failure.
BC review the literature on the possible causes of persistently slow growth of 
productivity under five main headings: the absence in Britain until comparatively late in 
the post-1945 period of Chandleresque big, multi-divisional, vertically-integrated mass 
production business; the poor quality of British management; the greater technological 
flexibility of US managers (for example, in the use of electricity supply and machine 
power); the limited R & D spending in British industry until the postwar period; and the 
absence of tight management control over the workforce, leading to overmanning in 
British manufacturing, which itself lies at the heart of British productivity problems. BC 
reformulate these five portmanteau explanations in a novel way to make them more 
recognisable to neo-classical spirits by calling upon the God of competition. 
Productivity lags can persist only if competitive forces are insufficiently strong to drive the 
inefficient out of business. Thus, the five 'explanations' of slow productivity growth 
become four 'causes' of blunted competition: the British economy of the interwar years 
was highly collusive, with a multiplicity of market sharing agreements and cartels, 
especially after the imposition of the general tariff in 1932. Secondly, the stock market 
failed to discipline inadequate managements because so little information was open to 
potential bidder; the hostile takeover was unknown in Britain before 1939. Thirdly, the 
weakness of competitive forces made it easy to keep old capital equipment in 
production. Finally, the state chose not to promote competitive forces but to emphasise 
profit margins and employment stability, to be achieved by the encouragement of 
collusion to raise prices. In this environment, there was little pressure on industrial 
management to seek to regain job control which allowed the craft unions in particular 
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scale. Thus, this is a basic neo-classical model in which the key factors are human 
capital formation, the size of the market and the extent of competition.
This account of the British economy in the interwar years is very attractive, at 
least on the surface. There are, however, two areas of comment. The first relates to 
human capital formation, and is one of the problems which Crafts, following the work of 
Prais and others at the NIESR, has emphasised as one of the principal longrun 
weaknesses of the British economy (BC, 29; Crafts 1988, xii; Crafts 1988b, 24). But the 
method of measuring human capital formation is to assume that factors are paid their 
appropriate marginal products, so that higher wage rates will reflect higher levels of 
human capital. Thus, a key conclusion emerges not by observation but as an 
embedded assumption of the basic model, which is unsatisfactory. BC try to 
supplement their 'evidence' by reference to secondary work on the subject, but this is 
an area in which much unsatisfactory work has been done. Until a reliable survey of 
interwar British and US 'systems' of education is undertaken in the way that Pollard 
compared and contrasted German and British provision in the period 1870-1914, it is 
perhaps best to remain healthily sceptical of the conclusions about British education 
and training in the interwar years. It is not, for example, immediately clear that the 
migrant workers sucked into interwar US automobile plants were better trained and 
educated than the craft derived workforces of British car plants, To criticise the interwar 
British economy for both a failure of vocational training and continuing with craft­
intensive methods seems to be a little inconsistent.
There are similar concerns about the importance of the competitive environment 
to BC's conclusions. Of course, it is virtually impossible to measure the degree of 
competition. There does not seem to be much doubt that the British economy in the 
1930s was highly collusive, but whether that uncompetitive environment can be used to 
explain the persistence of slow rates of British manufacturing productivity growth long 
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basis by the three-firm concentration ratio, the tariff rate and trade union density. While 
this may be acceptable for the 1930s, it seems inappropriate for the postwar period. It is 
certainly true that British industry has shifted significantly towards oligopoly since the later 
1950s. Figures for 1977 showed that in 30 per cent of the 162 manufacturing industries 
covered, the five largest firms accounted for 70 per cent of total output; however, when 
the same data are broken down into 817 product groups, in over half the cases the five 
largest firms accounted for 70 per cent of total output (Prest and Coppock 1984, 221-2). 
At the same time, however, foreign competition has increased in ways which may not 
be captured by changes in the tariff rate. Import penetration has been rising since the 
early 1960s initially in response to a major fall in the level of protection following the 
Kennedy round of GATT. But the tariff was only one factor; a ratchet effect has been 
observed as foreign suppliers reached the threshold at which distribution and servicing 
networks became viable (Alford 1988,42, 79). The relevance of union density figures to 
competition in this sense is obscure. It certainly does not seem unreasonable to suggest 
that competitive forces in the British economy have been strengthening since the mid- 
1960s and certainly the early 1970s and EEC entry. Yet the growth rate of British 
manufacturing productivity which accelerated during the 1960s was more or less 
stagnant during the 1970s. BC seem to indicate that only in the Thatcherite 1980s was 
the industrial climate sufficiently competitive to induce managers to confront the 
problems of poor productivity, and especially of overmanning which had become 
institutionalised since the 1930s. But surely they cannot mean that competition is 
sufficiently intense only when firms begin to collapse like buildings in an earthquake. The 
introduction of institutional analysis does not solve BC's problems, especially in relation to 
the role of the trade unions. BC argue that British craft unions sought to retain a share of 
control over intensity of effort and demarcation. But precisely how this concern 
translated into inefficient work practices, why British craft unions were able to preserve 
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thought they were trying to achieve is not at all captured by the insertion of a measure 
of trade union density by industry into a multiple regression analysis.
If Broadberry and Crafts have not been successful in integrating a trade union 
variable into their model, it does not necessarily follow that trade unions have had an 
insignificant effect on the pace of productivity growth in British manufacturing, it might 
simply be that Broadberry and Crafts have not identified the appropriate variable to 
insert into their regression, it appears obvious, for example, that what is needed is some 
measure of union strategy rather than of union density. It remains to be seen, however, 
that differences in union strategy can be presented in quantifiable form, especially as so 
little interpretative work has been undertaken on the problem. Where Broadberry and 
Crafts do point the way forward is in their focus on the competitive position in each 
industry as a critical starting point for the study of the impact of trade union strategies on 
productivity growth. This is certainly a definite advance on approaches which unions 
would necessarily inhibit productivity growth simply because they were either 
collectivities operating in an individualistic environment, or were bound by the logic of 
collective interest groups in stable societies, or, finally, were pre-destined to wage class 
war on the shopfloor.
V
The need for careful empirical study is emphasised by the work of industrial economists 
who have examined the performance of British industries since 1945. Pratten and 
Atkinson (1976), reviewing 25 separate studies of British firms undertaken between 1944 
and 1975 found overmanning and inefficient use of labour in every case, with restrictive 
labour practices identified as a cause of inefficiency on ten occasions. However, almost 
every study also identified poor management practices as a cause of low productivity 



























































































-  18 -
clearthat overmanning, whether created by union or management, was not the only 
factor contributing to poor performance. Pratten and Atkinson compiled a long list of 
contributory factors: differences of scale, differences of lengths of production runs, 
differences in the age of capital equipment and other differences in the stock of 
capital. Pratten's own study of productivity differentials within international companies 
attempted to estimate the relative magnitude of these various factors. He chose 
international companies because the methods of production ought to have been 
similar in the various plant of such firms. He found that in 1972 output per man in the 
North American plant of international companies was almost 50 per cent higher than in 
the UK, and productivity in German and French operations were 27 per cent and 15 per 
cent respectively above the UK levels. For comparisons with American factories, 
differences in the scale of production, and particularly the rate of output of products 
and the length of production runs, were often the main cause of differences in 
productivity. In comparing the British with the French and German plant of international 
companies. Pratten concluded that the less efficient British manpower and other labour 
practices were as important as differences in scale and capital equipment.
There are, however, problems with this body of literature. These studies give an 
effective 'snapshot' of the problems of particular industries at a particular time, but they 
cannot explain Britain's slower rate of growth of labour productivity over time; only 
comparative longitudinal studies can show if it was consistently easier for competitors to 
introduce new methods dnd negotiate appropriate manning levels. This point also 
applies to Pratten's work on international companies. The choice of multinationals 
incorporates a strong element of comparative study, but the longitudinal aspect is 
almost absent and the source of much of his information (interviews - primarily with 
managers) imparts a suspicion of partiality - the behaviour of workers was regarded as 
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which other empirical studies have emphasised, was not mentioned as a cause of poor 
British performance.
In the substantial study directed for the NIESR by Prais (1981) an explicitly 
comparative framework was adopted in an examination of labour productivity in the 
UK, the USA and West Germany at the level of manufacturing as a whole and in ten 
selected industries. In the micro-level studies the utility of an historical perspective was 
explicitly recognised. In six of these industries, Prais concluded that productivity growth 
had been retarded by problems in negotiating appropriate manning levels with trade 
unions when technological improvements had become possible. But Prais's study 
concerns itself neither with reasons why it was more difficult to negotiate appropriate 
manning levels in Britain, nor with the attitudes of the parties concerned. If we wish to 
understand why certain courses of action were or were not taken, we need to examine 
motivation, and that was no part of Prais's project.
VI
The approach thus far might appear unduly negative; it must be clear that there is no a 
priori reason to suppose that unions necessarily have a positive or a negative effect on 
the pace of productivity growth. Neither can positive or negative effects be deduced 
from the longevity and stability of the union movement nor from the structure and 
organisation of bargaining associations. But there are also very positive conclusions. We 
believe that a broad agenda for research on the effects of trade unions on productivity 
has emerged. On the basis of the discussion above, we would suggest that empirical 
observation should focus on the following three dimensions: first, the structure and 
changing markets of the economy; secondly, the origins, scope and strategies of 
collective bargaining associations; and thirdly, the institutional environment of the 
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conclusions forward in two ways; first, by reporting the conclusions from a comparative 
study of interwar labour relations and productivity growth in Sweden and Britain to 
illustrate the importance of and limits to labour market and institutional explanations. 
And secondly, we offer for discussion the framework for a large-scale study of unions 
and productivity since 1945.
In inteiwar Sweden the structure and 'scope' (in Batstone's sense) of bargaining 
associations allowed capital and labour to identify a general interest for their class and 
the nation. The growth of the economy and the market opportunities in the decades 
before 1940 required the rapid shift from agricultural to higher quality industrial 
production, with the leoding sectors being dominated by larger industrial and financial 
firms. Both employers and workers had the potential for a strong bargaining position, 
though both suffered seriously in the economic crisis of the early 1920s. These influences 
can be traced in the evolving structures and strategies of the main bargaining 
associations as they sought to build a comprehensive front for employers and unions 
respectively. The power of the national bodies and their capacity for conflict became 
fully apparent in the late 1920s, but the institutional environment began to change in 
response to shifts in the political views of trade union members and of other social 
groups. It is possible to argue that the origin of the 'Swedish model' of industrial relations 
is to be found in the growing commitment of labour to solidaristic principle on wages, 
employment and social benefits which led unions to become much more concerned 
with the competitive position of employers and ultimately to co-operation over the 
modernisation of Swedish industry in the late 1930s and 1940s. The structure of Swedish 
bargaining associations showed no great shifts in scope and sophistication but 
permitted widely different strategies by unions and employers. Equally clearly, the 
strategies of shopfloor bargaining agents was shaped and coloured by national 




























































































In the case of Britain, the contrasts in the pattern of institution-building and 
conflict are stark. Sectionalism and occupational frictions were almost as apparent 
amongst employers as among craftsmen and labourers. The structure and scope of 
organisations reflected the provincial identities of the employers and the demand for 
district autonomy from the workforce. The formidable cost constraints and institutional 
rigidities of the manufacturing sector made any consensus on reconstruction extremely 
unlikely. Employers' leaders were determined to defend the 'managerial prerogatives' 
of the individual firm against the unions and the state. Issues of technology and 
organisation on the shop floor were recognised as the battleground for workplace 
control rather than the means of promoting a common interest in productivity 
improvement. There was little sign of a growing consensus in wider society despite the 
rise of labour. Employers and unions took highly defensive positions with regard to 
wages, employment and social welfare; the aim was to secure an advantage in the 
labour market and. in turn, this was incompatible with the definition of a consensual 
national interest. Thus, in this case structure and strategy were more closely intertwined, 
but it is possible to identify initiatives which might have resulted in institutional reform and 
which foundered as much on economic collapse as the sectionalism and frictions of the 
bargaining associations.
Thus, it is the interaction between national institutions and the market position of 
the national economy which helps to shape trade union behaviour and, hence, the 
impact of organised labour on productivity growth, Neither the characteristics of the 
institutional framework nor the relative strength of the national economy is enough by 
itself to 'explain' trade union behaviour. Thus, our view of development and importance 
of the 'Swedish system' of industrial relations is subtly different from that of Ingham (1974) 
in that we place much more emphasis on the market structure and position of Sweden's 
economic development since the turn of the century. It is also reassuring to note that 




























































































explanations of relatively poor British performance, do in fact see Britain's problems in 
terms of the interaction of markets and industrial relations institutions. Thus. Lorenz and 
Wilkinson (1986, p. 128) conclude that 'the failure of the British response in shipbuilding 
Cdn be understood only by considering the particular technical and market conditions 
in which the firms operated, and the ways in which these conditions interacted with the 
systems of industrial relations'. A very similar conclusion emerges from Lewchuk's (1987) 
work on the failure of the British motor car producers in the 1970s which stresses the 
evolution of a particularly British method of production and labour management in the 
formative years of the industry which proved very resistant to change when market 
conditions became less favourable and led managers to seek more direct control of the 
production process, Thus, the broad framework which we are suggesting seems to offer 
potentially useful results.
VII
These favourable preliminary results encourage us to flesh out a methodology in greater 
depth. Perhaps the most persistent difficulty in explaining the source of productivity 
growth is the need to disentangle macro and micro levels of cousality ond analysis. This 
is particularly important if we are to investigate the claims for 'institutions' having an 
impact on output and productivity growth. For the single most important facet of 
economic life since 1945 has been the massive increase in the role of the state in the 
advanced economies. Governments have taken responsibility for the reform of 
collective bargaining in an attempt to improve the performance of industry. In the 
British case, we have the growth of a wide-ranging literature in economics and politics 
which has emphasised the failure of the British state to take a positive role in the 
modernisation of a failing economy (Gamble, 1988; Newton and Porter, 1988; Ingham. 




























































































importance in explaining the context for productivity growth, though it is extremely 
difficult to trace the complex relationships between macro institutions and shopfloor 
performance.
Our starting hypothesis is that the positive or negative impact of trade unions 
cannot be demonstrated a priori. Such an analysis must begin with an examination of 
the historical structure and evolved strategies of the union itself. Union strategies are the 
consequence of established practices and responses of the institution to its environment. 
Any study of union attitudes towards productivity must concern itself with the way in 
which information is received by the organisation and how leaders communicate with 
their members. It is not simply a question of discriminating between what is intended 
and what emerges, but how the strategies emerge from the existing structures of the 
union. The most obvious part of the environment to which union leaders and members 
must adapt is the economic situation in which they are operating. Trade unions do not 
make decisions (or exert influence) in isolation from the labour and product markets in 
which they function. It is also true that markets are themselves subject to a variety of 
institutional structures and that the legal and political constitution of society must 
provide the framework for capital-labour relations. It is the interface between institutions 
and markets that provides the terrain for trade union activity.
The period in which to study these two aspects of trade union behaviour must 
contain significant changes in the competitive position of both the macro-economy 
and individual sectors chosen for detailed study but must also be sufficiently distant to 
permit some measure of historical detachment. The most obvious difficulty of most of 
the participants to the 'productivity miracle' debate which we have cited so copiously is 
that their very closeness to the events they were describing did not allow them to 
distinguish trend from cycle. These desiderata are met by the period 1945-70. British 
policy makers had to come to terms first with the extent of the productivity gap which 




























































































'economic miracles' in one European country after another, whilst British output and 
productivity growth seemed sluggish. British governments innovated an increasingly 
sophisticated array of policies to prod both sides of industry into more competitive 
patterns of behaviour. In the late 1940s, the Attlee government tried moral suasion 
through the Anglo-American Council for Productivity. When this failed, there were a 
series of measures by the Conservative governments of the 1950s to introduce a series of 
measures to improve the quality of management and make it more responsive to 
market forces. In the 1960s there emerged a structure of political bargaining with 
productivity improvement as one of the key issues on the agenda, not least because the 
level of effective protection for British manufactures was greatly reduced by the 
Kennedy Round of GATT. The limits of corporatist management persuaded governments 
of the need, following Donovan (1968), of a radical reform of trade unions rather than 
engage in a wide ranging programme of modernising government and industry. 
Meanwhile manufacturing productivity growth continued to disappoint employers and 
government alike.
We believe that there is a particular need to investigate the ways in which the 
trade unions responded both to the bargaining climate (of which full employment was a 
vital feature) and the policy initiatives outlined in the previous paragraph. There exist 
good studies of the economic programme of unions in Britain and other countries during 
this period (Gourevitch et al. 1984). The changing climate of industrial relations has 
been extremely well covered (Crouch, 1979). Union participation in incomes policy an 
crisis management has been the subject of various accounts (Dorfman, 1973; Panitch, 
1976; Middlemas, 1979; Fishbein, 1984). What we lack is some explanation of how unions 
perceived this policy process, and how policy-engagement influenced the behaviour of 
both union leaders and members towards productivity improvement. It seems likely that 
the leaders were drawn into a shared discourse with politicians and employers, though it 




























































































need to ascertain to what degree government policy objectives were influenced by 
union thinking and the ways in which policy statements shaped behaviour on the 
shopfloor. In short, in the critical area of productivity improvement there is a real need 
for research to identify the extent of convergence between the main participants and 
the extent to which convergence at the aggregate level shaped behaviour on the shop 
floor. Such research will investigate the behaviour patterns which are assumed by the 
most commonly deployed analytical approaches which have been outlined above and 
will begin to give an empirical base to the study of union strategies on productivity.
Clearly, the choice of micro-level case study is criticdl. Ideally, it would be 
possible to select a sector which would permit comparisons with other European 
countries. The obvious case would be engineering. In Britain (as elsewhere) it is a vital 
sector for technological diffusion and has been the focus of much discussion of 
productivity in the period since 1945. It has also been recognised as a pace setter for 
industrial wages and collective bargaining in manufacturing for much of this period (as 
has been the case in other countries). Thirdly, the sector has a range of branches with a 
variety of skill levels and scope for new mass production technologies. Finally, the 
institutional practices of the main British union (the AEU) have attracted considerable 
attention and research. It seems clear, therefore, that the engineering sector offers not 
only an attractive test case in the British context, but also ample scope for comparative 
study.
Logistical considerations dictate that it would be sensible to take two contrasting 
branches of engineering and examine shopfloor strategies in areas with obvious 
implications for productivity growth. It would be sensible to take one firm in the medium- 
heavy sector, preferably with a secure market and a male, craft base and another in a 
lighter sector of consumer durables in a more volatile market and using cheaper female 
labour with fewer recognised manual skills. The aim is to use firm- and plant-level records 




























































































introduction of new technologies, training, supervision, and incentive pay. We hope to 
obtain documentary sources and a series of interviews with shopfioor union officials, line 
management and those responsible for the negotiation of company or plant collective 
agreements. Clearly, it is unlikely that studies in other countries will exactly replicate the 
branches of engineering which we hope to choose in Britain. The strategic position of 
the case studies is much more important than the precise nature of the business carried 
on within the firms chosen for study.
What we hope to construct is a rather more complex picture than that stated 
with such authority by Donovan more than two decades ago. Donovan (1968) 
identified in Britain 'two worlds' of industrial relations (the world of formal procedures and 
bargaining, and the world of shopfioor practices) which were in conflict. On the key 
question of labour productivity, it is possible that there was a third, superimposed level of 
macro-economic policy formulation which had neither the authority of formal 
agreements nor the continuous flexibility of shopfioor practices. It is in the interaction of 
these three levels that explanations of trade union strategies on productivity must be 
located. It is certain that some part of the explanation of differences in rates of 
productivity growth must lie in the differences between countries in the ways that the 
macro-economic, formal industry level, and shopfioor negotiations are interrelated and 
conducted. It is our view, however, that the existing models described above fail to 
appreciate the complexity of the problem. If trade unions have obstructed productivity 
improvement it might have come either at the leadership or the shopfioor levels, or 
both: if only one level is primary obstructive, then channels of communication and 
control must also form part of the problem. The proposed method of approach would 
also permit a conclusion that unions were prepared to co-operate with productivity­
enhancing measures but were frustrated by poor management or by a government 




























































































productivity change at the shopfloor level. We suggest that there are more realistic 
alternatives than the over-simplified approaches with which we began.
In helping to evaluate the evidence which we hope this project will generate, 
we have constantly referred to the benefits of comparative study. This project has 
grown out of existing collaborative work at Exeter and Uppsala Universities on interwar 
productivity, including the survey of Swedish and British union strategies reported above. 
The work proposed in this paper complements parallel studies already being planned at 
Uppsala and Gothenburg and should enable us to address more sensitively the complex 
question of trade union strategies on productivity in two industrial countries in the long 
boom. Both the Swedish and British projects also form part of a much wider research 
initiative on the broader question of trade union strategies directed from the European 
University Institute (see Abelshauser and Dartmann. 1990). This forms an excellent milieu 





























































































ABELSHAUSER, W. (1990), 'Strategies of European trade unions', mimeo.
ABELSHAUSER, W. and DARTMANN, C. (1990), 'Strategies of European trade unions: 
determinants and impacts of trade union strategies since the late 19th century', 
European University Institute. Project Paper.
ADDISON, J.T. and BARNETT, A.H. (1982), "The impact of unions on productivity', British 
Journal of Industrial Relations. XX, 2, pp. 145-62.
ALFORD, B.W.E. (1988), British economic performance. 1945-1975. Macmillan.
BALL, Sir J. (1989), 'The United Kingdom economy: miracle or mirage?'. National 
Westminster Bank, Quarterly Review. Feb. 43-59.
BARNETT, C. (1986), 'Labour and productivity', Oxford Review of Economic Policy 
(OREPI), 2, pp.32-43.
BOOTH, A. (1987), 'Britain in the 1930s: a managed economy?'. Economic History 
Review, XL. 499-522.
BRAVERMAN, H. (1974), Labour and Monopoly Capital, Monthly Review Press, New York.
BROADBERRY, S.N. (1988), 'The impact of the world wars on the longrun performance of 
the British economy', OREP.4 ,1,25-37.
BROADBERRY, S.N. and CRAFTS. N.F.R. (1990), 'Explaining Anglo-American productivity 
differences in the mid-twentieth century'. Centre for Economic Policy Research, 
Discussion Paper CEPRDP.
BROADBERRY, S.N, and FREMDLING, R. (1990), 'Comparative productivity in British and 
German industry, 1907-1937', CEPRDP.
CRAFTS, N.F.R. (1988a), 'The assessment: British economic growth over the long run', 
OREP, 4, 1, pp.i-xxi.
CRAFTS, N.F.R. (1988b), 'British economic growth before and after 1979: a review of the 
evidence', CEPRDP, 292.
CROUCH, C. (1979). The politics of Industrial Relations. London, Fontana.
CHOI, K. (1983), 'A statistical test of Olson's model', in D.C. Mueller (ed), The political 
economy of growth. New Haven, Yale University Press (YUP),
DONOVAN, Lord (1968), Royal commission on trade unions and employers' associations 
report. HMSO,
DORFMAN, G. (1973), Wage politics in Britain. Ames, Iowa State University Press.





























































































FISHBEIN, W. (1984), Wage restraint bv consensus, Routledge.
FRIEDMAN, A. (1977). Industry and labour, Macmillan.
GAMBLE, A. (1988), Britain in decline. 2nd edn. Macmillan.
GARDINER, J. (1981), 'The labour process' in S. Aaronovitch et al. The political economy 
of British capitalism: a marxist analysis. McGrow Hill.
GROUREVITCH, P. et al. (1984), Unions and economic crisis: Britain, West Germany and 
Sweden. Allen and Unwin.
INGHAM, G.K. (1984), Capitalism divided? The city and industry in British social 
development, Macmillan.
JOHANSSON, A. (1990), 'Swedish industrial relations and the Saltsjobaden agreement of 
1938', typescript.
IEWCHUK, W. (1987), American technology and the British vehicle industry. Cambridge 
University Press (CUP).
MAYNARD, G. (1988), The economy under Mrs Thatcher. Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
MELLING, J.L. (1990), 'Whatever happened to red Clydeside? Industrial conflict and the 
politics of skill'. International Review of Social History. XXXV, 3-32.
METCALF, D. (1989), 'Trade unions and economic performance: the British evidence', in 
C. Dell'Aringa and R. Brunetta. eds. markets, institutions and co-operation: labour 
relations and economic performance. Macmillan.
MIDDLEMAS, K. (1979), Politics in Industrial Society. Deutsch.
MINTZBERG, H. (1977), 'Paterns in Strategy Formation', Management Science. 24,934-48.
MUELLBAUER, J. (1986), 'Productivity and competitiveness in British manufacturing: the 
assessment', OREP, II. 3. pp.i-xxv.
NEWTON, S. and PORTER, D. (1988). Modernisation frustrated. Allen and Unwin.
NOLAN, P. (1989), 'The productivity miracle?' in F. Green, ed. The restructuring of the UK 
economy. Brighton, Harvester-Wheatsheaf.
NICHOLS. T. (1986), The British worker question. Routledge.
OLSON, M. (1982). The rise and decline of nations. New Haven, YUP.
PANITCH, L. (1976). Social democracy and industrial militancy. CUP.
PHELPS BROWN. E. (1977), 'What is the British predicament?'. Three Banks Review. 116.3- 
29.
PRAIS, S.J. (1981), Productivity and industrial structure: a statistical study of




























































































PRATTEN. C.F. (19760). A comparison of the performance of Swedish and UK companies. 
University of Cambridge, Department of Applied Economics, Occasional Paper 
(UCDAEOP). 47, CUP.
PRATTEN, C.F. (1976b), Labour productivity differentials within international companies. 
UCDAEOP 50. CUP.
PRATTEN, C.F. and ATKINSON, A.G, (1976), 'The use of manpower in British manufacturing 
industry'. Department of Employment Gazette. June, 571-6.
PRICE, R. (1989), 'What is in a name? Workplace history and "rank and filism"'. 
International Review of Social History. XXXIV, 62-77,
PREST, A.R. and COPPOCK, D.J. (1984), The UK economy: a manual of applied
economics. 10th edn. Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
TURNER, B. ed. (1989) Organisational symbolism. Berlin, de Gruyter.
WADWHANI, S. (1989), 'The effects of unions on productivity growth, investment and 
employment: a report on some recent work'. LSE Centre for Labour Economics:
Discussion Paper, 356.
WILLIAMS, K. et al. (1989), 'Do labour costs really matter?'. Work, Employment and 
Society, 3.281-305.
ZEITLIN, J. (1980), 'The emergence of shop steward organisation and job control in the 
British car industry'. History Workshop Journal. X, 119-37.
ZEITLIN. J. (1985), 'Shopfloor bargaining and the state: a contradictory relationship', in S. 
Tolliday and J. Zeitlin, eds. Shopfloor bargaining and the state: historical and
comparative perspectives. CUP.
ZEITLIN, J. (1989), '"Rank and filism" in British labour history: a critique'. International 






























































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the 
European University Institute, Florence
Copies can be obtained free of charge -  depending on the availability of
stocks -  from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy



























































































Publications of the European University Institute
To The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana




□  Please send me a complete list of EUI Working Papers
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI book publications
□  Please send me the EUI brochure Academic Year 1990/91








































































































Labor Costs and Employment in 
the Service Economy
8 9 /413
Francisco S. TORRES 





The Demographics of Age in 
Labor Market Management
89 /415
Fritz von NORDHEIM NIELSEN 
The Scandinavian Model: 




Reserve Switches and Exchange- 
Rate Variability: The Presumed 
Inherent Instability of the Multiple 
Reserve-Currency System
89 /417
José P. ESPERANÇA/Neil KAY 
Foreign Direct Investment and 
Competition in the Advertising 
Sector: The Italian Case
8 9 /418
Luigi BRIGHI/Mario FORNI 
Aggregation Across Agents in 
Demand Systems
89 /419
H. U. JESSURUN d'OLIVEIRA 
Nationality and Apartheid:
Some Reflections on the Use of 
Nationality Law as a Weapon 








Telecommunications Regulation in 
the European Community: The 
Commission of the European 
Communities as Regulatory Actor
89/422
Marcus MILLER/Mark SALMON 





Time Consistency, Discounting 




On the Differential Geometry of 




On the Impossibility of Perfect
Capital Markets
89/426
Peter J. HAMMOND 
Perfected Option Markets in 




























































































Peter J. HAMMOND 
Irreducibility, Resource 




"Business Format" Franchising 



























































































EUI Working Papers as from 1990
As from January 1990, the EUI Working Papers Series is divided into six 
sub-series, each series will be numbered individually (e.g. EUI Working 
































































































Single Mothers in Early
Twentieth Century Sweden:Two
Studies
HEC No. 90/2 
Jean-Pierre CAVAILLE 
Un théâtre de la science et de la 
mort à l’époque baroque: 
l’amphithéâtre d ’anatomie de 
Leiden
HEC No. 90/3 
Jean-François DUBOST 
Significations de la lettre de 
naturalité dans la France des 
XVIe et XVIIe siècles
HEC No. 90/4
Alan BOOTH/Joseph MELLING 
Trade Unions Strategies and 
Productivity: A Suggested 
Framework
HEC No. 90/5 
Bo STRATH
Union Strategies in Historical 
Perspective: Sweden and 
Germany
Working Papers in Economics
ECO No. 90/1
Tamer BA§AR/Mark SALMON 
Credibility and the Value of 
Information Transmission in a 




The EMS. The First Ten Years
Policies. Developments. Evolution
ECO No. 90/3 
Peter J. HAMMOND 
Interpersonal Comparisons of 
Utility: Why and how they are 
and should be made
ECO No. 90/4 
Peter J. HAMMOND 
A Revelation Principle for 
(Boundedly) Bayesian 
Rationalizable Strategies
ECO No. 90/5 
Peter J. HAMMOND 
Independence of Irrelevant 
Interpersonal Comparisons
ECO No. 90/6 
Hal R. VARIAN 
A Solution to the Problem of 
Externalities and Public Goods 



























































































ECO No. 90/7 
Hal R. VARIAN 





Futures Markets, Speculation and 
Monopoly Pricing








The Role of Information in
Economics
ECO No. 90/11
Nicos M. CHRISTODOULAKIS 
Debt Dynamics in a Small Open 
Economy
ECO No. 90/12
Stephen C. SMITH 




Learning by Doing and 
Market Structures
ECO No. 90/14





Socially Acceptable Distortion of 




Fringe Size and Cartel Stability
ECO No. 90/17 
John MICKLEWRIGHT 
Why Do Less Than a Quarter of 
the Unemployed in Britain Re­
ceive Unemployment Insurance?
ECO No. 90/18 
Mmdula A. PATEL 
Optimal Life Cycle Saving 
With Borrowing Constraints:
A Graphical Solution
ECO No. 90/19 
Peter J. HAMMOND 
Money Metric Measures of 
Individual and Social Welfare 
Allowing for Environmental 
Externalities
ECO No. 90/20 
Louis PHLIPS/
Ronald M. HARSTADT 
Oligopolistic Manipulation of 
































































































ECO No. 90/22 
John MICKLEWRIGHT 
The Reform of Unemployment 
Compensation: Choices for East 
and West
ECO No. 90/23 
Joerg MAYER
U. S. Dollar and Deutschmark as 
Reserve Assets
Working Papers in Law
LAW No. 90/1
David NELKEN





1992 -  What are our Rights? 
Agenda for a Human Rights 
Action Plan






Legislativer Trilog im Institutio- 
nellen Dreieck der Europaischen 
Gemeinschaft. Das Verfahren der 
Zusammenarbeit nach Artikel 
149 Absatz 2 EWGV.
LAW No. 90/5 
Renaud DEHOUSSE 
Représentation territoriale et 
représentation institutionnelle: 
réflexions sur la réforme du 





W. M. LEVELT-OVERMARS/ 
F. H. M. POSSEN 
Primus Inter Pares: The Euro­
pean Court and National Courts. 
The Follow-up by National 
Courts of Preliminary Rulings ex 
Art. 177 of the Treaty of Rome: 
A Report on the Situation in the 
Netherlands




LAW No. 90/8 
Bruno DE WITTE 
The Integrated Mediterranean 





































































































Educational Expansion and 
Changes in Women's Entry into 
Marriage and Motherhood in the 
Federal Republic of Germany
Working Papers of the
EPU No. 90/1 
Renaud DEHOUSSE/
Joseph H.H. WEILER 
EPC and the Single Act:
From Soft Law to Hard Law?
EPU No. 90/2 
Richard N. MOTT 
Federal-State Relations in 
U.S. Environmental Law: 
Implications for the European 
Community
EPU No. 90/3 
Christian JOERGES 
Product Safety Law, Internal 
Market Policy and the Proposal 
for a Directive on General 
Product Safety
SPS No. 90/3 
Nico WILTERDINK 
Where Nations Meet: National 




Changes in Educational 
Opportunities in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. A 
Longitudinal Study of Cohorts 
Bom Between 1916 and 1965
European Policy Unit
EPU No. 90/4 
Martin WESTLAKE 
The Origin and Development 
of the Question Time Procedure 
in the European Parliament
EPU No. 90/5
Ana Isabel ESCALONA ORCAO 
La cooperation de la CEE al de- 
sarrollo de America Latina:el ca- 



























































































Working Papers in European Cultural Studies
ECS No. 90/1 
Léonce BEKEMANS 
European Integration and 
Cultural Policies. Analysis of a 
Dialectic Polarity
ECS No. 90/2 
Christine FAURE 
Intellectuelles et citoyenneté 
en France, de la révolution 





















































































































































































«*V 0 0 1
O
3i
i0
^'
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
